Thesis

the footnotes that wouldn't publish

2005-10-07T18:38:00.000-07:00

Vladimir Putin, “Russia: Putin Calls Chechnya Internal Issue,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2002. Available from World Wide Web at (http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/11/12112002122021.asp).
Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” in Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3 (1993)
For a good explanation of this look to: Anna Politkovskaya, Dispatches from Hell, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003.)
Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998) 357
Author unknown, “The Chechens are Fighting for Your Freedom,” Islamic Awakening.com. (2003). Available on the World Wide Web at (http://www.as-sahwah.com/viewnews.php?newsid65).

Galina Yemelianova, “Russia’s Umma and its Muftis,” Religion, State and Society, vol. 31, no. 2, (2003): 139-140, 147
Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone, 332, 359
Look to the above quotation by Vladimir Putin.
Anne Zelkina, In Quest of God and Freedom, (New York: New York University Press, 2000) 33
Leonid Sykiainen, “Shari’ah and Muslim Law Culture,” Political Islam and conflicts in Russia and Central Asia, from Central Asia and the Caucasus, (1999): 1
Sykiainen, 7
William Ochsenwald and Sydney Fisher, The Middle East: A History, (Boston: McGraw Hill) 7-8
Sykiainen, 7-8
Zelkina, Quest, 54
Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone, 331
Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone, 332
Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone, 332
Zelkina, Quest, 58
Galina Yemelianova and Hilary Pilkington, Islam in Post-Soviet Russia: Public and Private Faces. (London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 30
Zelkina, Quest, 64
Zelkina, Quest, 59
Zelkina, Quest, 68
Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone, 306
Sykiainen, 8
Sykiainen, 8
Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone, 359
Yo’av Karny, Highlanders, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000), 215
Karny, Highlanders, 224
Karny, Highlanders, 225
Yemelianova, Russia’s Umma, 139-140
Francesca Mereu “Russia: Islam Plays Fundamental Role in North Caucasus Life,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2002 Available from World Wide Web at www.rferl.org/2002/01/04012002113316.asp).
Mereu 2002
Anna Politkovskaya, Dispatches from Hell, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003.), 139
Mereu 2002
Karny, Highlanders, 227
Alexsey Krindatch, “Patterns of Religious Change in Post-Soviet Russia,” Religion State and Society, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2004): 124 and Valery Tishkov, Chechnya: Life in a War Torn Society, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004) 166-7
Karny, Highlanders, 253
John Esposito, Islam: The Strait Path, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 117-118
Karny, Highlanders, 253
Fanny Colonna, “Cultural Resistance and Religious Legitimacy in Colonial Algeria,” Islam in Tribal Societies, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), 241
Colonna, 242
Colonna,
Aleksei Malashenko and Dmitri Trenin, Russia’s Restless Frontier: The Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia, (Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), 72
For a very interesting examination of Middle Eastern integration into the modern system and resulting 20th century political movements (not necessarily Islamist) look to: Hanna Batatu, The Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi Revolutions: Some Observations on their Underlying Causes and Social Character. (Washington D.C: Georgetown University, 1983), specifically p. 4.
Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, (Berkley: University of California Press, 2000)
Author unknown, Islamic Awakening, 2003
Yemelianova, Russia’s Umma, 141
Yemelianova, Islam in Post-Soviet Russia, 54-55
Anna Matveeva, “The Islamist Challenge in Post-Soviet Eurasia,” Political Islam and conflicts in Russia and Central Asia, from Central Asia and the Caucasus, (1999): 2
Matveeva, 2
Yemelianova, Russia’s Umma, 147
A good explanation of this process is from Aleksei Malashenko who writes, “The social reasons for the politicizing of Islam lie in the general crisis of the system, the difficulties of rebuilding of society and the lowering of the status of the entire social strata-this leads to disaffection and spurs the people to look for a way out of the current situation via authentic ethnic and religious values that were lost in the Soviet era and have not been reconstructed in the post-Soviet period. We speak of a search for an Islamic alternative.” This contributed to the Islamic Renaissance but, with the corruption of the clergy, other forms of Islamic were more relevant to the people. As to be shown later, this would also contribute to the growth of Wahhabism for those to whom traditional Sufism proved inadequate. Aleksei Malashenko, “Islam and Politics in Central Asian States,” in Political Islam and conflicts in Russia and Central Asia, from Central Asia and the Caucasus. (1999), 3
Khazanov, After the USSR, 218
Fred Weir, “Where Rebellion is a Tradition,” Christian Science Monitor. December 31, 1999. Available on the World Wide Web at (http://www.csmonitor.com/atcsmonitor/specials/chechnya/ch20.html).
Aleksei Malashenko, “The glitter and poverty of Chechen Islam,” The Security of the Caspian Sea Region, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 298
Valery Tishkov, Chechnya: Life in a War Torn Society, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004) 169
Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone, 363
Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone, 364
A good example of this wartime/post-collapse anomie is seen in the following statement by a former hostage: “[These ‘bandits’ who were fighting for Chechen independence all] recalled Soviet times as the best days of their lives. I particularly remember a former tractor driver who had lost all his savings in Pavlov’s monetary reforms. For some reason, he blamed me personally for his misfortune. He would beat me up repeating, ‘Under the communists I was a rich man, but now I have to fight and trade in hostages.’” from Igor Rotar, “Under the Green Banner: Islamic Radicals in Russia and the Former Soviet Union,” Religion, State and Society, Vol. 30 No. 2, (2002): 98
Igor Rotar, “Under the Green Banner: Islamic Radicals in Russia and the Former Soviet Union,” Religion, State and Society, Vol. 30 No. 2, (2002): 97
Tishkov, Chechnya: Life, 171
Vakhit Akaev, “Religious-Political Confrontation in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria,” Political Islam and conflicts in Russia and Central Asia, from Central Asia and the Caucasus, (1999): 2
Akaev, 1
Walter Comins-Richmond Walter, “Legal Pluralism in the Northwest Caucasus: The Role of Shari’ah Courts,” Religion, State, and Society, vol. 32, no. 1, (2004): 66
Akaev, 2
Rotar, 108
Rotar, 108: For a summary of how expenses were paid for look to Tishkov, 175-6.
Alexsey Krindatch expresses a decent summary of this process: “There are various reasons for the recent emergence and spread of the Wahhabi movement in the Russian Caucasus. First, as a result of 70 years of communist antireligious policy the Islamic regions of Russia have to l large extent lost their own specific historically rooted religious traditions. The absence of cultural immunity and the crisis of identity in post-Soviet society created favorable conditions for the spread of new ‘imported’ Islamic movements and ideas. Second, the dynamic rise of Wahhabism is characteristic of areas experiencing high unemployment and economic decline. This is the case in Russia’s Islamic regions in the Northern Caucasus, where the ideas of restoring equality and social justice propagated by the Wahhabi leaders, have become popular, particularly among the younger generation of Russian Muslims. Third, the increasing activity of foreign Islamic missionaries is backed by financial support from the Wahhabi movement abroad, mainly from Saudi Arabia and Egypt (Razhbandinov, 1998)” Krindatch, 124
Akaev, 3
Tishkov, Chechnya: Life, 173
Karny, Highlanders, 255
Karny, Highlanders, 256
Edward Walker, “No War, No Peace in the Caucasus,” in Crossroads and Conflict (2000): 152-187
Tishkov, Chechnya: Life, 204
For a good depiction of life on the ground for Russian and Chechen soldiers, as well as the Chechen people and the refugees, look to Anna Politkovskaya’s A Dirty War, (look below) and Dispatches from Hell.
Rotar, 107
Politkovskaya, Hell, 140
Just before the beginning of the second war Maskhadov did declare Chechnya an Islamic republic, but only under immense political pressure, in an attempt to steal the impetus from his political opponents.
Karny, Highlanders, 256
Maskhadov Alan, “Open Letter to the French Philosopher André Glucksman,” Central Asia Survey, vol. 19, no. 3/4 (2000): 314
Politkovskaya, Hell, 179
Maskhadov, Aslan. “Statement by the President of the ChRI A. Maskhadov,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. 9/24/2004. Available on the World Wide Web at (http://www.chechnya-mfa.info/print_news.php?func=detail&par=123).

Rotar, 108
Rotar, 110
Nivat Anne, Chienne de Guerre, (New York: Public Affairs, 2001) 45
Nivat, Chienne, 46
Rotar, 105-6
Anna Politkovskaya, A Dirty War, (London: The Harvill Press, 2001) 195-6
Akaev, 7
Maskhadov, 312
Rotar, 111
Politkovskaya, Dirty, 193-5
Andrew Meier. Black Earth: A Journey Through Russia After the Fall, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2003), 84

Rotar, 111
Nivat, Chienne, 199-200
Author unknown. “ ‘Adat’ in today’s Chechnya.” Chechnya Free. (2004). Available on the World Wide Web at (http://www.chechnyafree.ru/index.php?lng=eng§ion=moderheng&row=9).
Kavkaz-Center 2004, see bibliography Magamadov, Musa. “Foundations of Chechen Society Challenged.” Kavkaz-Center. Available on the World Wide Web at (http://www.kavkazcenter.net/eng/article.php?id=2883).

Anonymous, “What life is like under the Russian Occupation-the Realities of Today’s Chechnya,” Central Asia Survey, vol. 22, no. 4 (December 2002): 462-3
Anonymous, 463

2005-10-07T18:29:00.000-07:00

Jesse Wheeler
14777939
12/6/04

The Role of Islam in the Russo-Chechen Conflict:
Traditional versus Fundamentalist Conceptions of Islam

Pr. Christine Kulke
History 101:
Border Identities

The Role of Islam in the Russo-Chechen Conflict:
Traditional Versus Fundamentalist Conceptions of Islam

"I think you [a French journalist] are from a country that is, in fact, an ally of the United States of America. You are in danger. They [Chechen separatists] speak about the necessity of killing... all non-Muslims. If you are a Christian, you are in danger. But if you reject your religion and become an atheist, you are also slated for liquidation, according to their way of thinking and their rules.”

The above statement by Russian president Vladimir Putin represents how, in recent years, the ongoing struggle between Chechnya and the Russian Federation has been labeled another front in the global war on terrorism, a hot spot in the “clash of civilizations.” While it is certainly true that radical Islamic elements, both inside and outside of Chechnya, seek the elimination of Russian and Western influence in the North Caucasus, it is wrong to look at the entire conflict and the history of the conflict within this paradigm. The implications of viewing the Chechen resistance as merely unrestrained religious hatred and Chechen society as uniformly radical have been and still could be very negative for both Russia and Chechnya, leading to indiscriminate prejudice and the destruction of any common ground that might bring the war to an end.
This is not to say, however, that Islam, of whatever variety, has had no role to play in the conflict. That role, in fact, is quite substantial and nuanced. It is essential in understanding Chechen national/ethnic identity and, as a result, it plays a considerable role in the Chechen independence movement. In addition, differing notions of Islam are essential in explaining inter-Chechen divisions. By analyzing Chechen opinions, statements, and journalistic accounts, and using insights from field specialists, this paper examines the very nuanced role that Islam plays in the Russo-Chechen conflict. I focus on those cleavages within Chechen Islam that have actually contributed to the failure of radical Islam, despite its growing influence, to significantly take root.
This subject is important for a variety of reasons. In our most recent “historical epoch,” the “war on terror” has become an ever increasingly important concept, wherever one falls along the political spectrum. Not only of geo-strategic concern, it is also important theoretically, for “the war on terror” has provided the international system with a new ideology through which to conduct and justify foreign policy, complete with a fresh set of perceived international angels and demons. At the heart of this new paradigm resides Islamic radicalism. Russia, seeking international and domestic legitimacy for its campaign in Chechnya, has advertised itself as an ally in the global war on terror and Chechnya as Russia’s own distinct contribution to the fight against Islamic radicalism. International Islamists (radicals) have also used Chechnya as a symbol, for their own ends, in the struggle against secular/western powers. Because the Chechen conflict has been branded another front in our most recent global war, it is necessary to study the events taking place, the people involved and the infinite nuances that complicate the matter. It is these, which as a result, make broad proclamations and over simplifications woefully inadequate in accurately describing the situation.
Islam in Chechnya can be roughly divided into three main categories. First there is the largely ineffectual, official Russian religious establishment, which during Soviet times was co-opted and closely monitored by the state and which, following Soviet collapse, has been seen as being “self-obsessed, over-materialistic, corrupt, and theologically incompetent.” Second, traditional Chechen Islam, to which the majority of Chechens still adhere, has not only been a source of genuine piety, but is also strongly associated with Chechen ethnic/national identity. This Islam is Sufi, a largely mystic variant of Islam that allows much room for the recognition of local customs. In Chechnya the defense of native traditions, which are often in direct contradictions with Islamic law, and the defense of Islam have, paradoxically, become intrinsically linked. The third Islam, recently imported by foreign missionaries following Soviet collapse, is that of Islamic fundamentalism, also known as Wahhabism, Islamism, radicalism, salafiya, and/or jamaat. Islamic fundamentalism was born out of an 18th century reform movement which sought the purity of Islam and the Islamic world, and called for a return to an idealized vision of life as it was during Mohammed’s time, before centuries of corruption, distortion and innovation. It was particularly suspicious of Sufism, whose leniency towards and even acceptance of local tradition was seen as a major source of Islamic impurity. Fundamentalism called for the strict observance of Muslim Law. It, as a result of advocating both political as well as spiritual purity, became associated over the years with numerous political and revolutionary movements in the Muslim world. And, it became remarkably successful at providing such movements with an ideological voice and moral justification.
Although Chechnya, plagued by war, social chaos and economic collapse, seemingly appears to be facing near perfect conditions for the proliferation of Islamic fundamentalism, it has not significantly taken root among the majority population. For many combatants, fundamentalism does indeed provide an ideological framework and motivation for their continuing struggle with Russia. The majority of the population, however, sees fundamentalism as not only foreign, but also hostile to their own traditional conception of Islam. Under a perceived threat of genocide by Russian military aggression, many Chechens are simply unwilling to accept a religion that is openly hostile to their traditional ways of life, [of which they are trying to preserve].
This paper is composed of four main sections. The first two sections consist of a background study, examining Chechen/Russian and Chechen/Soviet relations. These sections explain the nature of traditional Chechen Islam and its role in Chechen national identity, as well the nature of Islamic fundamentalism as practiced elsewhere. The third section looks at Soviet collapse and the first Russo-Chechen War (1994-96), studying how both traditional Chechen and radical Islam came to play an important role in the conflict. The fourth section, in addition to explaining the interwar years (1996-99) and the outbreak of new hostilities in 1999, analyzes how the fundamental contradictions between these two understanding of Islam have contributed, despite claims to the contrary, to the failure of radical Islam, as of yet, to establish itself as the primary religious expression of the Chechen people.

Part I: Traditional Islam
Before being able to understanding the importance of Islam in contemporary Chechnya, a brief study of Chechen Islam and past Russo-Chechen relations is necessary. There are a number of claims as to when Islam first appeared in the North Caucasus and Chechnya, ranging from the eighth and ninth centuries to as late as the fifteenth and even eighteenth centuries. What is important, however, is that Islam came to Chechnya in the form of Sufism, a mystical variant of Islam that allows much room for recognition of local customs along side Islamic tradition. Islam, in general, recognizes two important cultural/legal traditions, “Shari’ah”, or divine law, and “‘Adat,” or customary tradition. According Leonid Sykiiainen, a scholar of Islam,
“The term Shari’ah is used to describe the path ordained by Allah, which if followed by the faithful, can lead them to the attainment of perfection, worldly well-being, and access to paradise. At the same time, the general description of the Shari’ah as an aggregate of precepts established by Allah and transmitted to the people via the prophet has become established in Islamic literature.”

While,
“ ‘Adat conventionally implies customs... having taken root and being practiced in a certain area where Islam prevails and observed mainly by force of habit. In Islamic studies, ‘Adat means customs and traditions that regulate the way of life of Muslims alongside Shari’ah. Muslim jurisprudence generally allows for the use of ‘Adat on the condition that it should not contravene the Shari’ah”

In Chechnya, however, the norms of Shari’ah were, on the whole, completely foreign ideas more suitable to Arabic culture than their own. ‘Adat not only dominated, but often ran counter to the principles of Shari’ah and many ‘Adat customs took shape “while [pre-Islamic] tribal and clan relationships and pagan beliefs still prevailed.” This is, in fact, the reason that Sufism expanded as much as it did. It allowed cultures not closely related to Arabic culture to maintain much of their traditions and even elements of earlier belief systems. This often resulted in a synchronism between Islamic and local elements. The primary factor, however, for the spread and acceptance of Sufi Islam in Chechnya, resulted from its ability to inspire resistance to Russian imperial expanse.
According to historian Anatol Lieven, the Russians and Chechens first came in contact with each other in the late 15th century. The Russian presence, however, remained generally passive until the late 18th century when, under Catherine the Great, the Russians eventually established a permanent military presence in the Caucasus. “Before the arrival of the Russians,” Lieven writes, “the Chechens never had any close contact at all with any major or serious state” and it was only after contact with the Russians did the idea of a Chechen national (or proto-national) identity begin to appear. This identity developed in direct response to the conquest and domination by Russia. Lieven, in Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power, says,
“It could be said therefore that it was Russia that was the catalyst which set off the chemical reaction out of which ultimately developed contemporary Chechen national identity; by trying to conquer the Chechens it thereby encouraged them to resist, and adopt institutions and strategies of resistance.”
And, it was the adoption of Sufi Islam that became the Chechens most significant institution in the resistance. Lieven writes, “Intimately connected with the Russian Conquest and the resistance to it was the adoption of Sufi Islam, which...became both the inspirer and the organizer of Chechen resistance”
While other North Caucasians cooperated with the Ottomans in response to Russian advances, to those in the east, historian Anne Zelkina writes,
“The anti-colonial struggle came to be expressed in terms of a broader religious movement under the auspices of Islam.” This tendency first became embodied in the movement led by a Chechen from the village of Aldy, generally known as Sheik or Imam Mansour.”

“Mansour,” according to historian Galina Yemelianova in Islam in Post-Soviet Russia, “had been able to use Islam, particularly the Sufi Islam... as the ideological framework for the first political unification of the region.” In his resistance to the Russians, the sheik sought the restructuring of North Caucasian life and introduce Shari’ah as best he could, giving birth to the process whereby Islam and the struggle for independence increasingly went hand in hand. Mansour was the first leader to somewhat successfully combine the national and the religious struggle. Baddeley, in his book... writes,
“He failed it is true. But it was he who first taught the peoples of the North Caucasus that in religious reform lay one chance of preserving their cherished liberty and independence and therefore laid the foundation...for the coming century.”

Perhaps the most important figure in Chechen historical memory, however, is the person of Imam Shamil. In the 19th century the Russians pursued an active policy of fully subjugating the Caucasian regions formally under Russian control, to “bring the khans and tribes of the region under full submission.” This inspired resistance. Beginning in the 1830’s, Imam Shamil led and dominated this resistance, who during the next thirty years tried but failed to create a unified Islamic regime. As both a political and religious leader Shamil, like leaders before him, sought the introduction of various aspects of Shari’ah law. But, being more attune to political realities than his predecessors, Shamil knew this could only go so far. Sykiiainen writes,
“Shamil’s predecessors tried, as they preached the Shari’ah, to restrict in every way the operation of customs. They failed in the end to seriously change the traditional way of life of the mountain peoples. Shamil was obliged to solve the problem of ‘Adat and took resolute measures to eradicate many of them. At, the same time, [however,] Shamil objectively assessed the force of customs and.... he knew that ‘Adat were not merely customs but rather the core of the mountaineers’ way of life. Renouncing them would undermine the very foundations mountaineer communities.”
Shamil knew well that Shari’ah could not be introduced unless it respected and even conceded, at times, to the overwhelming strength of ‘Adat in Chechen society. Shamil, therefore, used Islam as a galvanizing force for the defense of the Caucasus and the creation of his state. But, he knew that radically altering the way in which the Chechens lived, “the social person-to-person relationships that had taken centuries to form,” would undermine those very people who made up his political base.
The use of Islam provided a capable resistance strategy, but only with respect to native Chechen tradition. It was only through the flexibility of Sufi Islam that this fusion could take place. Chechen national identity developed out of a specifically North Caucasian brand of Islam, while many Islamic norms, or what are considered Islamic norms, remained alien. Lieven writes,
“It was in the early nineteenth century that radical Sufism [resistance and holy war] among the Chechens made rapid strides, precisely due to the fact it preached resistance to the Russians, who were beginning to press harder and harder on the Mountain tribes. Defense of Islam and defense of the Mountaineers’ ethnic traditions societies and largely pre-Islamic way of life ran together from the start, and though the feelings of the Mountaineers at that time cold not be described as ‘nationalist’ in the modern sense, they might be called proto-nationalist.”
The rhetoric of holy war (or jihad or gazzmaat) became intrinsically linked with the Chechen the struggle to preserve their liberty. It was the ability to galvanize support and inspire resistance to the Russians for the maintenance of traditional Chechen ways of life that contributed to Islam’s expanse. But, all attempts at reform and the introduction of Shari’ah norms failed where they went against and specifically contradicted Chechen customs, their ‘Adat. Ironically, it might be seen that the Chechens used Islam to preserve many of their traditional, non-Islamic ways of life. No place is this better shown than in the teachings of Kunta Haji, a former shepherd who was to have immense influence on the spiritual life of Chechnya who opposed Shamil’s attempts to introduce Shari’ah. According to Yo’av Karny, in Highlanders,
“Man, Kunta Haji said can reach God, even if he is illiterate and unschooled in the ways of the Koran and Shari’ah. He need only recite intently the Arabic word for “There is no God but Allah.” Kunta’s message resonated with the people of the mountains.”

Later Karny writes, in response to the question of whether Kunta was a pacifist (Kunta advocated stopping the war with the Russians because it was destroying the Chechen people, ) that Kunta reportedly stated, “But if you are forced to forget your language, your customs, then rise up in arms and perish, all of you.” These two quotations show both how unpopular the implementation of Shari’ah was among the Chechen highlanders and how Kunta wanted to stop the war in so much as it was destroying the Chechen people. However, if it meant loosing their heritage than they were to fight at all costs. This reveals the importance of Chechen tradition and the way in which it was preserved and defended in the name of Islam.
Chechen national/ethnic (or proto-national) identity developed specifically in the fight against Russia, which was taken up in the name of Sufi Islam (that is in many ways a cover for traditional Chechen belies and practices.) Chechen Islam and national identity are therefore intricately linked. And, this close correlation was to have important implications for the future shape of Chechnya and the progression of the Russo-Chechen war, as it would eventually help to stave off the influence of fundamentalism.

Part II: Soviet Times, Sufi Resistance, and Islamic Fundamentalism

The correlation between traditional Islam and Chechen national identity is further highlighted in Soviet times. In the twentieth century the Soviet Union, ideologically, sought the elimination of Islamic beliefs and practices. But, the infeasibility of this goal led the Soviets, instead, to keep the Islamic establishment under tight state control. Regarding this, Yemelianova writes,
“Against the background of institutionalized atheism the Bolsheviks pursued a policy of control and accommodation of Islam rather than its complete eradication. Thus throughout the tsarist and Soviet periods muftiates [official Islamic leadership] proved to be effective tools of control and regulation of the Muslim minority by the state.”

However, concerning traditional and non-establishment forms of Islam, as practiced in Chechnya, the Soviet Union was quite suspicious. The distrust of traditional Islamic elements in Chechnya, which on numerous occasions inspired revolt, led the state to condemn “Sufi spiritual leaders and believers [as] counterrevolutionaries.” Most mosques were closed and many Chechen Muslims were arrested, deported or executed. In 1944 this distrust culminated in the mass deportation of the entire Chechen population to Kazakhstan. Francesca Moreu, in an article from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty quotes Mikhail Roshim, a professor at the Oriental Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, when she writes,
“Far from destroying the Sufi brotherhoods, the mass deportation actually had the opposite effect: ‘It may seem strange but the deportation played a conservatory role for the Islamic traditions, since Soviet authorities thought that the Chechens were in exile and didn’t care about them anymore. Chechens preserved their spiritual life, their inner Islamic world.’”
Following the deportation’s end, in 1958, the Sufis continued to be persecuted. They, however, still survived. Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya, in Dispatches from Hell, writes,
Soviet Power sent young Chechen Islam into the underground. After [returning from the deportation], they were forbidden to erect mosques. [As a result,] there was almost no clergy to be controlled by the KGB. [Therefore,] viable free religious communities emerged. If there was a mullah (think: priest), he was answerable to the town. If there wasn’t, the elders were respected much more and there was a brotherhood in every community. Chechens reacted to the establishment of a muftiate either indifferently (“we’ll go on as always,”) or with anger (“there’re tied to the KGB.)”
Returning to Mereu’s article, she writes,
Only in 1979 did Soviet authorities allow the opening of a few mosques to stop the growth of clandestine Sufi brotherhoods. Indeed, the orders themselves organized their own clandestine classes and schools where the Koran was taught. In Chechnya and Ingushetia, there were five legal and 292 clandestine mosques.”
This illegal expression of Sufism not only helped preserve Chechen Islam, but also continued to serve as a form of protest to Russian rule. Traditional Chechen religious expressions, in spite of hardship and deportation [that some have even called genocide,] were only partly undermined. Unlike those of many other Muslims peoples, Chechen traditions not only survived, but in many instances strengthened in response to Soviet persecution. Chechen Islam was a means through which Chechens could organize and quietly reject Soviet rule. Although a number of Chechens were secularized as a result of Soviet policies, most, however, followed traditional Islam.
Meanwhile, beyond the borders of the Soviet Union, Islamic fundamentalism was gaining influence and becoming increasingly important as a political and religious force. Having analyzed the importance of traditional Sufism to Chechen national identity, as a means of organizing and rejecting Soviet rule, it is necessary to study the aims and origins of fundamentalism in order to fully understand the contradictions between the two notions of Islam. Fundamentalism, a particularly modern brand of reformist Islam, was first expressed by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, (1703-1792) who has often, somewhat anachronistically, been labeled the Islamic Martin Luther and the father of an “Islamic Reformation.” Wahhabism sought a “return to the pure, unadulterated Islam of the period of Prophet Muhammad’s time” in the years before the Umayyad takeover. According to John Esposito, in Islam: the Strait path,
“[Wahhab] was appalled by many of the popular religious practices in [Saudi Arabia], such as veneration of Saints and their tombs, which he condemned as paganism and idolatry. To Wahhab political weakness of the community and its moral decline were due to a deviation from the strait path of Islam. The cure was to return to true Islamic practice, a return to a community life based strictly on the Koran and the example of Muhammad. Wahhab joined up with a local tribal chief, Muhammad ibn Saud, and a militant reformist movement was set in motion that would subdue large areas of Arabia. Religious zeal and military power were united in a religio-political movement that waged holy war with an uncompromising commitment that viewed all Muslims who resisted as unbelievers, enemies of God who must be fought. The purpose of ijtihad was a return to a purified Islam by weeding out those un-Islamic beliefs and practices that had infiltrated the law and life of Muslims. Because he was in Arabia, his revivalism was literalist; he equated “Arab” and “Islam.”
In the words of Karny, “What makes Wahhab such an important part of this story is that he declared war on Sufism, which he equated with evil.” Wahhabism and like-minded reformist movements have become, over the years, increasingly powerful political-theologies in the modern Middle East and larger Muslim world. Their proliferation has often led to inter-communal divisions and strife, with Wahhabism becoming particularly successful at giving an ideological voice and moral justification to revolutionary struggles.
Although everything is tied to specific and localized historical circumstances, a standard model as to the appeal of Islamic fundamentalism in the Muslim world relates to a reaction to modern European colonialism (and/or integration into the modern market system). Rather than relying on traditional and local power structures and relationships to maintain order, as the Ottomans had traditionally done, the colonizers’ economic and social policies accompanied (in a pretty standard modernizationist model) the breakup of traditional property relationships and the collapse of tribal structures, leading to the destruction of the economic and social base of traditional society. As a result, a segmented society originally broken into tribal units with a tribal and collective conception of economics and property, transformed into a society organized by various classes based upon different economic interests and social position. For example, as it concerns the growth of fundamentalism in Algeria, Fanny Colonna, in “Cultural Resistance and Religious Legitimacy in Colonial Algeria,” writes,
“Just as the fragmented reaction of the [Sufi] brotherhoods was adapted to a society fragmented into tribes, so the new conditions brought by colonization made both necessary and possible the establishment of an overall movement, at the level of the country as a whole, capable of organizing isolated individuals, without a tribal framework, through a puritan and individualistic religion...”
These radical changes forced individuals to create new forms of interaction and identity. A new relationship between the individual and society had to be created. For many, this identity took the form of an individualistic, universalistic, fundamentalist, puritan, and often nationalistic form of Islam that reflected the changing social make-up. (Another segment of society adopted European modes of self-identification and social organization. )
As a revolutionary movement, however, radical Islam provides an ideological role for the displaced individual in the post-colonial (or modern) Islamic society, much the same way Marxism did for the displaced worker in the 19th and early-20th centuries during industrialization. With economic and social modernization Islamism became an important 20th century social/political movement. Wahhabism provides a neatly packaged list of enemies and explanations that give form to a displaced individual’s war torn world. The colonial (or the post-colonial government) government responsible, or perceived to be responsible, for an individual’s loss of loved ones and property becomes the agent of evil. The radical fundamentalist, as a result has a moral obligation, being a true believer, to rage against the powers that, acting on behalf of evil, represents a barrier to the spread of Islam and the creation of a just Islamic regime on earth. Acts of terrorism, therefore, also become moral obligation. It is here, in the mission to reconstruct society upon an abstract perception of right, where things tend to get dangerous and innocent people tend to die.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union Chechnya and the Russian Muslims suddenly, after years of isolation, were not only opened up to but in many ways became part of the wider Islamic world. Because of this, the post-Soviet Muslims became subject, not only to the trends and forces affecting the wider Islamic world, but also became the direct target of foreign influences. Russian Muslims were exposed to fundamentalism and, in the chaotic times following Soviet collapse, it quickly made itself felt. And, to many radical Islamists, Chechnya has become another symbol of the struggle between good and evil.
While one might expect the above model to apply to Chechnya, being a colonized Islamic nation by a powerful non-Islamic empire, the specific conditions of Chechen national development have acted as a powerful moderating force in the spread of fundamentalism. Therefore, despite elements of similarity, one must not be tempted to apply the above model, carte blanc, to Chechnya.
In the late 1980’s and 1990’s two particularly anti-establishment forms of Islam were available to the Chechen people. Traditional Islam, intricately linked with both Chechen national identity and local customs, had served for years as a means of actively and passively resisting Russian rule. Radical fundamentalism sought the elimination of non-Islamic elements from Muslim lands, but in its desire to purge Islam of all innovation, it sought the elimination of many customs that Chechens consider a fundamental part of their national culture.

Part III: Soviet Collapse, The First Chechen War, and the Growth of Fundamentalism
When socialism finally fell, the territories of the former Soviet Union experienced an extraordinary Islamic re-birth as traditional, modern and official Islamic organizations proliferated. “The liberalization under Gorbechev and the subsequent disintegration the Soviet totalitarian state in 1991 [witnessed] the existing four muftiates superceded by dozens of new Islamic Spiritual Boards.” This dramatic increase in the number of muftiates (think: bishop) was also accompanied by a dramatic increase in both the numbers of mosques and the number of mullahs (think: priest) to fill them. In the 1980’s only 179 mosques operated in Russia, while in 1998 there were over 5, 500, [2000 of which were Chechen.] Also, as alluded to above, the loosening of censorship and the relaxation of borders allowed for increased contact between Russian and foreign Muslims, and this had a number of implications. These include foreign aid from a variety of sources, most notably Saudi Arabia, and also foreign missionaries, [often with an Islamist cause.]
There are a variety of reasons for this sudden increase in religious activity. In Soviet times, the state sought the replacement of traditional religion with the new Marxist dogma. And, while the state didn’t affect the Muslim communities as much as the Orthodox communities, primarily as a result of unfamiliarity, religion was still tightly controlled and state monitored. For all intents and purposes, Marxism was the new state religion and the Soviet state, [unlike the tsarist or current regime,] having the strength to penetrate the daily lives of its citizens, made it so. Marxism, backed up by immense state power, provided the social glue, the means through which the individual person related to and found their place with the broader community at large and, in many ways, the world. With the collapse of the Soviet state, the bankruptcy of Marxism as a social philosophy, and the resulting social chaos of transition, many reverted to traditional religions and symbols for comfort. Anna Matveeva gives a good summary of the post-Soviet religious revival when she writes,
“The collapse of the Communist system and the USSR left a moral vacuum. Political hurdles and uncertainties of the 1990’s, deprivation and the loss of the previous status, made the lives of ordinary citizens more hard and their emotional world more turbulent. Transition has often strained the social and political fabric, leading people to turn to traditional symbols and rites in a way of comforting and orienting themselves. Turning to Islam provided a degree of certainty and rooted- ness.”
People sought after religion as a means of coping with the disintegration of their society around them. However, the official religious establishment would soon disappoint many.
This is because the religious revival, to many, “was rather limited.” The collapse of communism left in its wake massive and widespread corruption that affected every level of society as many sought self-enrichment at the expense, essentially, of Russia and the Russians. And, Russia’s Islamic community was not exempt. The unscrupulous practices of the many “new muftis” in the official Russian Islamic establishment would eventually lead to widespread disillusionment among many Muslim, or newfound Muslim believers. Of the situation Yemelianova writes,
“Most of Russia’s new muftis can be seen as Islamic manifestations of a characteristic post-Soviet phenomenon, the rise of the ‘new Russians’. They have exploited the breakup of the Soviet system for their personal political and economic advantage. In doing so they have been aloof from the interests of state and society, which they have exploited rhetorically only for populist reasons. The mufti boom in Russia has occurred in isolation form the grassroots Islamic communities and from below the muftis are seen as self-obsessed, over-materialistic, corrupt, and theologically incompetent.”
These “rotten mullahs” were unable to fill the needs of the Islamic population and resulted in the search for or continued devotion to alternative, non-establishment forms of religious expression.
This situation was no different in Chechnya, where communist collapse and the corruption and traditional weakness of the official clergy contributed to the revitalization of traditional Sufism and the expansion of new fundamentalist forms of religious understanding. An obviously corrupt, self-serving, clergy, often with obvious political agendas, which had long been co-opted by the state, was unable to fill the needs of a good many in Chechen society. It was therefore the Sufi leaders and the Islamists that took up the banner of Islamic resistance to Russian power. The first Russo-Chechen war was to have a major contribution to the growing importance of religion in Chechen life, especially in the very impassioned form by which it took.
It is in the context of the fall of the Soviet Union, during the chaotic months after the failed August putsch, that General Dzhokhar Dudayev rose to prominence as champion of the Chechen nationalists and overthrew communist leader Doku Zavgaev. Following elections in 1991 Dudayev became president, declaring almost immediately afterwards that Chechnya was an independent nation. Moscow did not support this and Yeltsin immediately declared a state of emergency, sending in airborne troops. In response, Dudayev became a popular figure in the resistance movement, receiving much more popular support than he previously had. Supported by Moscow, the internal opposition failed to succeed in bringing down Dudayev. This led Moscow to believe that “it would be impossible to defeat Dudaev without a direct and large scale military operation.” The subsequent invasion in 1994-1996 led to even further popular support for Dudayev. During the course the of invasion the Russian military, beset with morale and discipline problems and a lack of domestic support, was forced to withdraw after two years of bloody warfare and an estimated 80,000 deaths. The cease-fire agreement ending the conflict left Chechnya's national status in limbo.
The reasons explaining the initial decision on the part of the Chechens to both declare and fight so intensely for independence concern a number of historical, ethnic, and national factors. Although serving as a means of actively and passively resisting Russian and Soviet rule, Islam, according to Aleksei Malashenko “found itself on the periphery of the Chechens’ social consciousness and was not in demand at first as an ideological model of Chechen separatism.” In an often-quoted excerpt from a speech Dudayev gave at the last pre-war convention of Chechen elders in 1993, Dudayev proclaims,
“The Koran and the imamate are holy causes, and we should not use those in vain. There is a time for everything. There are many Muslim countries in the world, but few of them live in strict observance of Shari’ah law. If we declare Shari’ah law today, you will demand that the heads and hands of offenders be cut off, giving little thought to the fact that the next day it will be a rare man who keeps his heads and hands. You are not ready for that, nor am I. So let us put our souls in order to the Koran and our lives according to the constitution.”
It was during the course of the war, however, that religion began to play an ever-increasing and dominant role in both the resistance and in the lives of ordinary Chechens.
Being central to Chechen national identity in its resistance to the Russians, Islam therefore came to occupy a large role in the rhetoric of the nationalist movement. Lieven, discussing this, writes,
“The relative importance of religion and nationality has been reversed. For many leading figures, and certainly for Dudayev, it had essentially become an aspect of Chechen national tradition, rather than a central motivating force in its own right, [as it had been in the nineteenth century].... However, it was only with the autumn of 1994, and the imminent threat of war, that the rhetoric of political Islam became insistent- and even then it was I felt overwhelmingly a symbol and expression of national feeling rather than a detailed program in its own right.”
Before and during the war Islamic slogans were used as an important factor in Chechen cultural/national tradition. As the war progressed, Islam was increasingly used, coming to dominate political discourse. In interesting contrast to the above quotation, Dudayev, speaking to the convention of elders one year later in 1994, said that “one way to fight against Russian aggression would be to introduce Shari’ah law, but if the Russians stop the aggression, we will take away this Islamic constitution.” This example, though, shows not a genuine concern for religious piety, but rather the use of Islam for specific political objectives. [It is important to remember, too, that the Islam in discussion here is still the traditional Sufi Islam that has been, despite Soviet secularization, a fundamental part of Chechen society for many years.] However, as the war continued and the situation grew ever worse, with Chechen society crumbling under Russian firepower, many people turned to religion, both radical and traditional, as a means of alleviating their wartime anomie. Religion became the most effective way of organizing and motivating resistance to the Russian army and the most effective means through which many individuals could reestablish a semblance of ideological certainty and cohesiveness to their war torn lives. Alongside traditional Sufi nationalism, which was still growing as the ideological foundation of the nationalists, Wahhabism began to make itself felt, as a powerful revolutionary movement.
The advent of Wahhabism in Chechnya can be seen as a direct response to both the collapse of the soviet state and the devastating Russo-Chechen War. A number of studies have been done explaining why Islamism had become as important as it did, but I will briefly examine its appeal in Chechnya. A combination of exposure to broader Islamic events, post-soviet and wartime anomie, and economic incentives created favorable conditions for the advance of Islamic fundamentalism throughout a considerable segment of the Chechen population. A Grozny architect and eventual Wahhabi sympathizer summarizes the feelings of a growing number of Chechens when he says,
“During this war [1994-6], religion is used as an ideological weapon by unscrupulous people, who are known as such to the entire republic. Unfortunately, there were many such people among our clergy, who [forming a public council]... became notorious for ransacking all the government stores and lining their pockets with bribes. To be fair we must add that in protest against the corrupt clergy there emerged a religious association called Jamaat, which proclaimed the principle of moral purity, ghazavat [holy war], and a return to the original and pure Islam. Similar to them were the Wahhabis who rejected the people’s religion. The interesting thing is, you might expect the clergy’s corruption to make people turn away from religion, but instead they were still reaching for Islam, all over the country.”
This statement reiterates the corruption of the clergy but also shows how the war has contributed to the increasing appeal of fundamentalism. For it was during the war that both Sufi nationalists and fundamentalists mobilized against the Russians, making use of jihad as a political mobilizing force. Both groups fought and died together in the name of Jihad. Fundamentalism, at this point, was seen as an effective way of cleaning house in Chechnya and to wholeheartedly rebel against Russia. This explains a large part of its initial attractiveness. Chechen social scientist Vakhit Akaev, writes, “Having taken part in military operations against Russian troops in Chechnya, Wahhabites gained the aura of defenders of the homeland and warriors of Islam. This strengthened their position considerably.”
Especially important to the spread of fundamentalism in Chechnya concerns those for whom traditional Chechen religious understandings proved inadequate, similar to the way in which Marxism and official Islam both failed to provide a viable social philosophy. Included in this group of people are a large number young, poor, and/or previously secularized Chechens. The immense psychological, physical, and emotional suffering of this period accompanied the erosion of many people’s traditional ways of life. As this happened, a number of Chechens sought an alternative means of effectively filling the moral void in their life. Among many, especially the relatively poor, adherence to traditional Sufi customs became too much to bear. In Soviet times the increased standard of living accompanied with it a corresponding increase in the cost of carrying out cultural ceremonies, particularly those related to weddings. After the fall of the Soviet Union, however, some were unable to carry out these traditional practices, for fear of ruin. This created a rift between an individual and their traditional religious/cultural understanding, contributing to that individual’s displacement. Since the fundamentalists wish to do away with many cultural traditions, many were attracted to their message.
In addition, the destruction of the Chechen infrastructure has contributed to many jobless, listless men. For these men Wahhabism was appealing. In an interview with Igor Rotar, an RNTV television reporter said,
“When I was being held hostage by the Chechens in 1997 my guards used to yearn for the days when they were fighting the Russians. First thing in the morning they would already be cursing Maskhadov, who was trying to come to an agreement with the Kremlin, and waiting impatiently for a new war to start.”
To these men, Wahhabism gave direction and motivation. “They were given a real cause to defend, and were provided with a fair amount in expenses.” Ideological stability and financial assistance provide a strong incentive.
The main theme underlying the growth of Wahhabism in Chechnya concerns those for whom traditional society cannot fulfill its stabilizing role. Religion provides an individual with meaning and a place in the world. Modern secular religions (liberalism, nationalism, socialism) can provide this too, but these, as shown above, were inadequate in post-Soviet/wartime Chechnya. For the majority, traditional religious understanding served this function. But a decent segment of the population, those to whom traditional religious understandings proved inadequate, sought after a new religious understanding. And, amongst the passion and violence of war, a particularly virulent brand of radical Islamic fundamentalism filled that void. It was to be the weight of Chechen traditions, however, that contributed to the failure of radical Islam to effectively penetrate the whole of Chechen society.

Part IV: The Interwar Years, The Second Chechen War, and the Contradictions Between Traditional Islam and Fundamentalism
The growth of radical Islam has been studied by a number of scholars. Being such an interesting, volatile and influential movement, this is completely understandable. It, quiet plainly, is fascinating. There, in fact, are a number of common themes in explaining the proliferation of fundamentalism throughout other parts of the world and in explaining its appeal in Chechnya. However, Chechnya has been remarkably unique in its national development. Being formed in response to Russian imperial expanse, in the name of Sufi Islam, which in many ways was a cover for pre-Islamic beliefs and practices, Chechen national identity has provided a remarkable buffer to the attractiveness of Wahhabism. It is precisely this uniqueness that helps to explain why, despite what at times may seem perfect conditions for the advance of radical Islamic movements in Chechnya, they haven’t been as influential as one might think.
This section begins with a discussion of the post-1996 political situation in Chechnya, namely the rift between fundamentalist and traditional forces and the onset of the second Russo-Chechen war. Following this is an examination of the statements and feelings of the Chechen political leadership. Examining these often-heated statements, by four former allies in the fight against Russia, exposes how elemental the divisions within Chechen society have become and show a number of important themes as to why Wahhabism hasn’t come to dominate. Next is an analysis of how various segments in Chechen society have experienced the contradictions between the two Islamic doctrines.
Although both traditional Sufi and Wahhabi forces fought along side one another in the first Chechen War, the fundamental differences between the two Islams became evident following the withdrawal of Russian troops. While both fought in the name of Jihad, each faction had its own meaning. To one, Jihad inspires national unity and resistance to the Russians, while to the other, it represents the purification of the faith and the implementation of an Islamic political reality, based upon a narrow puritanical conception of Islam. Without the Russian threat to unite them, these elementary differences would cause rifts within Chechen society.
Following his death in 1996, Dudayev was succeeded by Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev who sought the implementation of Shari’ah principles in Chechnya. According to Akaev,
“Yandarbiyev issued a decree making Soviet and Russian laws invalid on the territory of Chechnya. He abolished the secular courts of Justice, created the Supreme Shari’ah Court and corresponding regional structures. The Criminal Code of these Shari’ah courts was copied from the criminal code of Sudan.”
Under Yandarbiyev, the Wahhabis held the political initiative in Chechnya. As to their views, Nasha nedelya (Our Week), a fundamentalist newspaper writes,
“The Sufis say that their Sheiks know the sacred mysteries but this claim stands in contradiction with the Koran. We say that the mysteries are known to none but Allah. The Sufis say that a sheik is needed as a mediator between Allah and His slaves. This is one of their main ideas. We say this notion is outside the framework of Islam. The Sufis say that their (religious leaders) are without sins or error. This too is contrary to Islamic belief. Some authorities [bar us from appealing to people through media] pointing to our deviations from the understanding of Islam. In reality it is the Sufis who act outside the Koran.”
Chechen Wahhabis reject the veneration of Saints, many forms of Sufi worship, and any particular spiritual privileges of the clergy, advocating strict adherence to Shari’ah. And, the fundamentalists sought the implementation of their views. According to Karny, “Alcoholoclasts roamed the streets in quest of drunkards, raided whorehouses and liquor stores, and meted out punishment in the name of Islamic law.” Severny Kavkaz, a Caucasian publication describes one particular occurrence,
“A small table was set in the central square. As it turned out, the table played the role of the proverbial gallows. First announced were the names of the drunkards, petty thieves and hooligans to be punished by whipping, according to the norms of Shari’ah. Concurrent with the floggings, raids were waged against all commercial kiosks and restaurants, resulting in the destruction of much liquor. The proprietors counted their losses and wept.”
However, following internationally monitored elections in 1997, Yandarbiyev was voted out of office, replaced by constitutionalist Aslan Maskhadov. But, in the period of “no war/no peace” that followed the cease-fire, president Maskhadov failed to effectively build a stable unified state and Chechnya was a center of criminal operations, near anarchy, and heated religious sectarianism. Akaev writes,
“The dhikrists [Sufis] became very active in trying to regain their lost positions in public life, with the support of Chechnya’s government. Then dhikrists and Wahhabites began earnestly competing for the greater influence of the population of the republic. The two groups were not ready to compromise.”
In 1998, these divisions within Chechen society came to a head in the city of Gudermes when the pro-constitutional forces championed by Maskhadov clashed with those forces favoring an Islamic state based upon Shari’ah under Shamil Basayev. Although the pro-Maskhadov forces were superior, it didn’t stop a coalition of Chechen and Dagestani Islamists, one year later, from invading Dagestan in an attempt to establish an Islamic state. It is this event that prompted Russian response and the most recent invasion of Chechnya. As a result of this invasion Maskhadov and Basayev, although deeply suspicious of one another, have both become the symbolic resistance leaders of their respective factions. Both deeply despise Russia. Ahmad Kadryov, a former enemy of Russia, switched sides and was appointed head of the Pro-Russian government. Although the conflict has technically been declared over, fighting continues and the conditions for all involved, [Russian soldiers, Chechen fighters, and the general population,] are less than desirable.
Those leaders that have occupied the spotlight of the latter stages of the Russo-Chechen conflict are the persons of President Aslan Maskhadov, field commander/war lord Shamil Basayev, along with Emir Khattab, and, until his recent assassination, head of the Pro-Russian government, Ahmad Kadryov. All three leaders were major figures in the initial Chechen independence movement. Maskhadov became president in 1997, following the brief presidency of Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, and has claimed presidency of Chechnya ever since. Basayev, a general in the first Chechen war, became famous not only for his military proficiency, but also for masterminding numerous terrorist attacks. He was to eventually become a key player in the post war split between the radicals and the pro-Maskhadov forces. Khattab, a professional mujahedeen from Jordan, has traveled from various hot spot to hot spot with foreign support. In 1994 he came to Chechnya, becoming one of the most famous field commanders and his presence is largely responsible for the proliferation of Islamic fundamentalism. Both Basayev and Khattab were fundamental players in the 1999 invasion of Dagestan. Kadryov, a now infamous ex-mullah, was appointed chief mufti of Chechnya, not by any spiritual board, but by the field commanders so he could declare jihad against Russia in the first war. All three men were central figures in the Chechen fight for independence, but since the end of the first war each have not only gone their separate ways, but have been violently hostile to each other. All, with the exception of Khattab, are Chechen, all Muslim, and all at one point sought independence. Examining this split is essential in explaining the unattractiveness of religious fundamentalism among the Chechens.
From the very beginning President Maskhadov has been opposed to the establishment of an Islamic state and has been especially vocal in his distrust of the Wahhabi. In 1998 Maskhadov made his move against the Wahhabis saying,
“The Chechens are from time immemorial Muslims, have their history, national traditions and customs and will never become either Arabs or Afghans...We are not going to tolerate in our land any more foreign citizens who are trying to establish their ways here”
Five year later, in December of 2003, Maskhadov in an “Open letter to the French philosopher André Glucksman” (Glucksman tried in vain to arrange an interview) writes,
“In order to live according to our traditions (Chechen women will never wear the veil-we are neither Islamists or Wahhabis) we are forced to resist the barbaric empire that ill fate has given us as a neighbor. We have no choice but to go on fighting- it is our duty to prevail. We know that if we accept a cease-fire unilaterally and lay down our weapons, we will be exterminated as an example to other north Caucasian subjects of the Federation. That is why the war will never stop.”
The above quotations reveal an ardent belief by Maskhadov, but more importantly by his intended audience, in the necessity of maintaining traditional Chechen customs and practices. They show the importance of those practices in the Chechen national identity and their importance in the resistance movement. Also of importance, in the second quotation, is the perceived threat of national annihilation.
In addition, Maskhadov has been described as a Chechen constitutionalist. All of Maskhadov’s appeals betray his belief that the only way to stop the war in his country is an appeal to the west to put pressure on Russia to put a stop to the war. He knows that in the current international environment it would be, and that it has been, political suicide for Chechnya to take up the cause of Islamic fundamentalism and holy war, in the manner of Basaev and Khattab. He therefore appeals to western models and focuses on human rights abuses to gain western sympathy. In a recent statement by Maskhadov concerning the Beslan School tragedy [taken from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chechnya], he proclaims,
[Concerning] Shamil Basayev’s statement in which he took responsibility for the terrorist act in the town of Beslan, I categorically declare that the government of [Chechnya] and the armed forces under my command have nothing to do with this terrorist act. I most decisively reject and condemn such methods of fighting. I declare that after the war persons who are guilty of carrying out such criminal acts will be taken to court, including Shamil Basaev. However, I find it necessary to note that such acts are a consequence of and reaction to the genocidal war of the Russian government against the Chechen peoples. It is widely known that the reason for this conflict with a four century long history, during which the Chechen people have suffered extremely severe acts of Genocide, is the striving of Russian colonialism to quell the will of the Chechen people to realize its vested right for self determination.”
In a number of proclamations like the one above Maskhadov has consistently condemned the use of terrorism in the fight, while at the same time remarking that it is a natural outcome of Russian aggression. In this is an obvious appeal to Western sentiments. He knows that terror is an anathema to the western mind and that all are naturally sympathetic to stories of human rights abuses.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the above quotations concerning the beliefs of Maskhadov and those who would support him. First, they show how, in the current international environment, Maskhadov believes it necessary to appeal to western sentiments, [as had happened in the first war when immense pressure was put on Russia, both domestically and internationally, to regulate its conduct in Chechnya.] An aggressive ideology that demonizes the west would therefore be rejected and would be suicide for the Chechen nation. Second, the statements reveal a desire to defend Chechen customs and traditional ways of living and of their importance to Chechen identity, which they are struggling to preserve in the face of both Russian aggression and Wahhabi activists. The final conclusion relates to this in that it reveals a belief that the struggle is no longer one of independence but rather for the literal survival of the Chechens as a people. Although also at war with Russia, the Islamist wing presents a profound threat to not only the Chechen cause but also their very existence by actively pursuing the destruction of many things that make up Chechen national identity. The second war is not seen as national liberation, but national survival.
Shamil Basayev could not have originally been called Wahhabi or fundamentalist. In a series of interviews with Igor Rotar, Basaev in 1996, says,
“I don’t know much about their teachings, but I’ve been in “Wahhabi” units a few times and I didn’t like their contempt for people who don’t share their view.” [Two years later, in 1998, he said,] “Wahhabi is a good word and it shouldn’t be just applied to Muslims when they do bad things. Yes, we have a movement of this kind. We have our differences. People go to extremes. But, these are mainly young people, striving for purity of faith. Everyone chooses his own path.”
In 1999, however, in an interview with a Lebanese newspaper Al-Amin, Basaev says,

“What is going on here is a mighty ‘jihad,’ a holy war to expel the infidels from an Islamic land, a land which has been in the Islamic fold for thirteen centuries...We are fighting to cleanse Dagestan from Russian troops...for the proclamation of an Islamic republic and the establishment of a greater Chechen empire in Chechnya and Dagestan, and later also in Ingushetia.”

These quotations reveal Basayev’s transformation over he years, or at least that of his public rhetoric. He has essentially adopted fundamentalist rhetoric, transforming Chechnya into a front in the long standing war between Islam and the infidels, as opposed to a struggle for national survival. Unlike Maskhadov, Basayev seeks not only the elimination of the Russian (infidel) presence in Chechnya, but also for the continued expansion of his Islamic forces, cleansing the region of all unholy elements and the establishment of an Islamic state. It is precisely this type of rhetoric, putting Chechnya in the offensive, which makes Russia very weary of the Chechens and less willing to seek peaceful resolution.
Basayev’s partner in crime, Khattab, was a fundamental figure before his death in the proliferation and spread of Wahhabism through Chechnya. In an interview with Anne Nivat, he is quoted as saying,
“ ‘Why wouldn’t I have the right to fight on Chechen territory?’ asks the Mudjahid, as he likes to be called. ‘Muslims have to help each other. Russia has attacked Tajikistan and Afghanistan in the past. They’re doing the same thing here. We’re not touching anyone. It’s the Russian army who has come to kill us. We’ve got to defend our territory, our women and children.’ To hear him you would think the Chechen forces were composed of gentle lambs devoted only to the cause of Islam: ‘Our only goal is to be allowed to live according to our laws, the laws of Shari’ah. As long as this is denied us, we’ll continue to fight. Politics play no part in this. We’re waging a war of religion.’”

Concerning Wahhabism, Khattab says, “Wahhabi, non-Wahhabi, it’s all the same thing. Here are only the Muslim faithful. We don’t make any distinctions. It was the Russians who invented that name.”
This interview with Khattab reveals a number of interesting facts about Chechen Wahhabism. Khattab passes himself off as the victim, despite the fact that it was specifically he and Basayev who brought the second war to Chechnya in their quest to establish an Islamic republic. The most relevant point, however, is his insistence upon fighting until Chechnya is free to live according to Shari’ah, “according to their own laws.” Khattab’s conception of freedom involves the elimination of non-Muslim influence, narrowly defined as non-Wahhabi influence, and to establish a Shari’ah based state, despite its incompatibility with a large number of Chechen tradition. To Khattab, Chechnya is a symbol. It is his own small corner in the global struggle between Islam and the powerful anti-Islamic powers. Lost in his interpretations are the multiple nuances and variables in Chechen society and the resistance. He ignores the fact that many Chechens do not accept the ritualistic observance to Shari’ah Khattab preaches. It is precisely this attitude that frustrates many Chechens, combatant or non-combatant, as to their experience with the fundamentalists.
The final piece to the puzzle of Chechen power relations is the person of Kadryov. Despite his infamy in many segments of the Chechen population, [especially among fighters], Kadryov represents the very splits within Chechen society that make the Chechen conflict so much more than an us-verses-them scenario. Although it may have been a large part of his decision making, there is more to say for Kadryov’s defection than self-enhancement. In a 1997 interview Kadryov said,
During the war [1994-6] detachments of Wahhabi volunteers came to us from the Arab countries. They were very well armed and so our own Chechens willingly joined them. Many of them went over to this new teaching and began trying to teach us as well, asserting that we were distorting Islam. For a long time we tried to avoid washing our dirty linen in public, asserting that there was no Wahhabi problem in the republic. We tried to come to peaceful agreement: Please do what you like, but don’t force your convictions on us, don’t accuse us of being heretics. The dialogue went no where.”

Later, in 2000, Kadryov said,
“All Chechens are Muslims but Chechnya should not be an Islamic republic. We once described ourselves in that way and did everything that goes against Islam. What good does it do us marching under the Green flag? Did we help Islam? No, in fact we were driving Muslims away from Islam! We were pushing the nation towards extremism. All these Taleban, Wahhabites and other tendencies are against Islam. They were deliberately encouraged by those who wanted the world to equate Islam with terrorism.”
After becoming head of the Pro-Russian government “he announced publicly that he ‘had no enemies except the Wahhabi.’” Kadryov’s dislike of the Wahhabis comes across as genuine. He fought against the Russians in the first war but it could be said that where Maskhadov’s hatred for the Russians overcame his dislike for the fundamentalists, Kadryov’s hatred for the Wahhabis overcame his dislike for the Russians. Kadryov, (like Maskhadov), expresses a belief that the fundamentalists are a threat to the Chechen nation. In an interview with Politkovskaya, he says,
“He [Maskhadov] allowed ordinary people to be robbed. He should have sent away all the mujahedin who had come from abroad, but he didn’t. My main goal today: the nation should not be stranded half way; no longer must it be deceived by this “independence” and “liberty” that no one has actually given us and nobody ever will. Freedom, in fact is something that the ordinary man does not need. He needs work in return for a wage and security. I want the Kremlin to give me a document that says that our people are the main treasure of the nation and no ideas should be allowed to lead them off to war.”
Considering his less than honorable reputation and total reliance on Russia, his word may seem ineffectual, yet they still come across as genuine. Rather than continue the war for survival, like Maskhadov, Kadryov sees the survival of the Chechen people not in rebellion, but in submission. It is the Wahhabis who he sees as the most detrimental to the Chechen nation. Specifically in their need to resist and spread the war to other Russian lands, they are leading to Chechnya’s ruin.
Comparing and contrasting each leader’s stance and proclamations reveals how both Maskhadov and Kadryov believe that their very national life is threatened. The desire to protect Chechen national existence works in two ways. The first is the desire to fight and defend the Chechen peoples’ very existence. Unwilling to sell out their culture and heritage, they cling to these more tightly, fighting to preserve their continuation. The Wahhabis, who actively pursue the eradication of Sufism and Chechen national traditions, are seen only as another threat. The second way involves loosing faith in the struggle altogether, in the belief that the war is only destroying the nation. To this group, the fundamentalists’ continuation of the war is seen as a major cause of that destruction.
Studying the leadership, however, can only offer so much when trying to determine the thoughts of a people. In the next segment, I will examine the statements of many as to why Wahhabism hasn’t been the factor it could have been. Andrew Meier records an encounter he had in a Chechen refugee camp with a Chechen man, when he writes,
“In another tent the children were listening to Musa Akhmadov, who had written a series of books on the Chechens customary law, the traditions that had governed relations among children and elders, lovers and enemies, known as ‘Adat. ‘Adat, Akhmadov said, had suffered in the war. ‘The backbone of Chechen culture’ he had called it. Since the Chechens earliest days, ‘Adat had drawn the lines between right and wrong. But in the turmoil of the years of the war, a new code, Shari’ah-the Islamic religious law imported by young men with beards who called themselves Wahhabi had threatened the continuum of ‘Adat. The two were incompatible, Akhmadov said. He feared the youngest refugees with no knowledge of the laws of old, would fall prey to the Wahhabis. The children, the writer worried would loose their Chechen heritage in the tents. After the first war he had believed it was the Chechens’ fault. ‘We’d won our freedom,’ he said, ‘but hadn’t learned how to use it.” Now he thought differently. ‘Look around you he said, “The Russians don’t want our land or our oil or our mountains. They want us to die out.”

This quotation echoes those words of Maskhodov and Kadryov. It, indeed, shows how influential Wahhabism has been due to the long period of violence and instability, but, more importantly, it also shows a reaction, an assertive attempt to re-instill in the young those traditions that constitute Chechen identity. Akhmadov, seeing the inroads Wahhabism is making throughout his society and culture, actively teaches the old traditions to the young. He is openly hostile to Wahhabism. He attaches so much value to the role of ‘Adat in Chechen national history. It occupies the very core of Chechen national identity and is threatened by both the Wahhabis and the Russians. What’s important to note is how, in the same vein, Akhmadov is deeply suspicious of Wahhabism and fearful that the Russians are exclusively out to destroy the Chechen people. These two ideas frequently run together. This shows how many Chechens, under the duress of war and occupation, are unwilling to re-examine their traditional culture and, instead, fight even harder for its preservation. Although Akhmadov doesn’t take up arms, he has waged his own war against the erosion of Chechen national traditions. Feeling as though Chechnya is facing a two front war Akhmadov fights to preserve Chechen traditions as best he can. The quotation indicates how this particular Chechen’s dislike of the fundamentalists only grows as he feels more and more threatened by the Russians.
Continuing this idea, Russian journalist Igor Rotar writes,
“A great many Chechens have spoken to me on the following lines: ‘When the Russian troops left Chechnya in 1990 we hoped we could start to live a normal peaceful life, but it was just one nightmare after another. Armed bands divided Chechnya up into zones of influence, while Maskhadov who was so popular at the time, could do nothing but watch the anarchy from his official residence. Today we hate the Russian Federal forces, who indiscriminately kill civilians almost as much as we hate our Wahhabis, who are only waiting for the next war to begin.”
This quotation shows even more how many Chechens feel caught between the Russians and the fundamentalists. It reveals a quest, by many, for normalcy and an aversion to the conflict, of which the Wahhabis only wish to continue. They see themselves caught in an unending conflict. The Russians are in Chechnya to eliminate the radical fundamentalists, but in reality they have indiscriminately persecuted many innocent people. The fundamentalists only wish to see the war go on. As a result, the Wahhabis are seen, in their ideological quest, as only bringing down Russian fury upon the Chechens.
An interesting story is that of a young girl Larissa, who Nivat describes in an interview. Nivat writes,
“ ‘Since I was little,’ [this female fighter says] says, ‘I have always wanted to make the gazovat [holy war]. And now here I am.’ Larissa hasn’t been to school in six years, but she doesn’t regret it. She reflects on the series of events that mark the war she considers just and necessary. ‘It won’t stop until Allah decides it,’ she says calmly. It’s he who imposes and we who dispose.’ As for her Russian enemies, Larissa is without pity: “Before, we just cut off their heads, now we have decided to eat them.” She states these words mechanically and, as if someone has stuffed phrases into her head. It’s the Wahhabis, the Islamic radicals who really spark her fury. “This war began, and continues, simply because of them. If it stops against the Russians we will continue it ourselves. It’s what our ancestors predicted since the beginning of time. According to them, there’s still one war left to win, the war of sabers, the ultimate war between those who believe and the others, that is the Wahhabis.”
This obviously fanatical young girl shows even more the disintegrating relationship between the traditional Chechen elements and the fundamentalists. In addition to showing the disturbing ideologies that easily spread in periods of war and social collapse, it repeats the hatred for both the Russians and the Wahhabi, who are seen as starting the war. This quotation, while showing how confused Larissa is, also represents a genuine feeling among those Chechen fighters she’s involved with. Although somewhat distorted, Larissa, in mentioning her ancestors, still expresses a belief in fighting for a traditional conception Chechen Islam and, in addition to seeing the Wahhabis as a threat, she sees them as actual enemies.
An interesting comparison can be made between an article taken from Chechnya-Free.ru, a pro- Kadryov website, and an article taken from Kavkaz-center.net, the website of the fundamentalist resistance. Explaining the role of ‘Adat in Chechen society, the author of the Chechen-Free article, writes,
“Chechen ethnographer Said Magomad Khasiyev speaks about ‘Adat in “The voice of the motherland” [A Chechen newspaper]. He says that ‘there are ‘Adats that elevate man, help him become better. They differ greatly from what the Chechens call “lamkersts” (the pagan custom of highland Chechnya.) Most Chechens reject these.” There are people who obey the rules of ‘Adat and there are these people who stick to the rules of Pagan law, in today’s Chechnya. The latter feel free to steal show off, use force. They may kidnap or rape or kill a girl. Siad-Magomed Khasiyev is calling for an emphasis on the time tested rules of ‘Adat. He points to the basic difference between ‘Adat and the rules of pagan law. He sees respect of ‘Adat as a way to the revival of public morality.”

This article is interesting in the way it consciously seeks to distance ‘Adat from pagan customs and rituals. By differentiating the two, the article attempts to defend Chechen ‘Adat and its place within Muslim culture as a legitimate form of social organization. In contrast to the above article is one taken from Kavkaz-center.net titled, “Foundation of Chechen Society Challenged.” The author writes,
“One of the main arguments in the vocabulary of the national traitors is the subject of the fight against the so-called Wahhabites, who are allegedly trying to impose an alien ideology on the Chechens. At the same time, anything that does not correspond to the practice of ‘KGB’s Islam’, cultivated in Chechnya during the Soviet rule, is declared being alien. Thus, any Muslim is declared a Wahhabist if all of a sudden he starts going to the mosque on a regular basis or grows a beard. Also, any woman gets accused immediately if she decides to conceal her nakedness from strangers [headscarf], or a young man gets accused if he quits smoking or consuming alcohol. Kadryov’s gangs and other groups of collaborators are challenging the very foundation of Chechen society.”
This article is fascinating in its blanket accusation that traditional Chechen religion is merely the product of Soviet conspiracies, and those who actively defend traditional Chechen Islam as national traitors. This article accuses traditional Chechen religion of actually being a foreign introduction, while adhering to the laws of Shari’ah, as natural course in a Muslims life. These excerpts show the deep splits that have occurred within Chechen society as it concerns the role of religion. The first article attempts to legitimize ‘Adat as a truly Muslim form of social organization, in all probability responding to accusations of paganism, while the second attempts to de-bug the idea of Wahhabism as a foreign introduction, accusing Chechen Islamic traditions of being false Russian creations.
The sheer fact of that matter, however, is that Islam spread to Chechnya through the incorporation of native, pagan traditions and that the strict observance of Shari’ah has never been a part of Chechen life. This fact is made even clearer by overwhelming hostility many Chechens have towards fundamentalism. Those who recognize traditional customs and seek to preserve their national character from a perceived Russian threat to destroy their very existence see Wahhabism as dangerous. The Wahhabis, in turn reject the very existence of traditional Chechen Islam as genuine religious expression. This helps to explain why, despite the fact that both sides are either facing persecution from or fighting against the Russians, a deep animosity has developed between the two factions. Again, the existence of this animosity highlights the internal divisions within Chechnya and Chechen Islam. Traditional Islam, however, still holds the majority of the population, as its adherents feel threatened by those actively reject their culture.
In an interesting article taken from Central Asia Survey, “What life is like in Chechnya under the Russian Occupation- the Realities of Today’s Chechnya,” an anonymous Chechen, in addition to a brutal critique of Russia, writes,
“The term Wahhabism was unknown to us up till the end of the first Chechen war. Chechens are followers of entirely traditional Islam and certainly not any radical one. I was surprised to hear that there were a lot of such newborn Islamic groups in Chechnya, most of which are being backed from abroad. It is often said that the followers of traditional Islam are hostile to the followers of the so-called Jammat group. These mostly young people who up till today did not even know the basics of Islam, suddenly found themselves amongst the most radical people in Chechnya have often caused a lot of problems by continuously looking for open conflict and confrontation with traditionalists. It is well known that on a couple of occasions such quarrels have ended very dramatically for both sides involved. So, most Chechens are trying to avoid any participation in these groups. Most Chechens believe that the so-called Wahhabbists are directly responsible for the suffering that continues under Russian rule. In my opinion, [their] invasion of Dagestan gave Russia a perfect opportunity to counter-attack. Because of their misguided actions and deeds, a lot of Chechens reacted against these intolerant and rather aggressive young people.”

This author also writes, “ [Russian] anti-terrorist operations soon began, but to fight terrorists did not require the bombing of our villages, the looting of our homes and the killing of so many innocent people.” This author, like many other Chechens, is critical of both the Russians and the Wahhabi. While the author’s anonymity presents a credibility problem, the above passage is in keeping with the statements and opinions of many other Chechens. The passage shows how many of the fundamentalists were those with little connection to previous Chechen traditions, and as shown above, this led them to Wahhabism. However, the majority of Chechens, still adherents of tradition Islam, (an Islam directly related to their national/ethnic identity,) have rejected fundamentalism for its hostility to their traditional ways of life and in its irresponsibility in bringing about the second war. In the end, fundamentalism is too new, too foreign, and considered too dangerous for the majority of the Chechen people to accept.
Whereas the first Chechen war can be seen as a struggle for national independence and the assertion of Chechen nationhood, many Chechens see the second war as leading to the destruction of the Chechen nation. And, in addition to the Russians themselves, the Wahhabis are to blame for this destruction, for both starting and continuing the war and in virulently attacking Chechen national culture. While the Wahhabis were initially seen as valiant helpers in the cause of Chechen liberation, they eventually came to be seen as undermining the very nation. It is therefore these elemental contradictions, between traditional and Wahhabi elements, that have led to the failure of fundamentalism in penetrating the heart of Chechen society.

Conclusion:
So, there are a number of reasons explaining why Islamic fundamentalism has failed, thus far, to significantly take root. The sources show how both a desire for normalcy and the belief that the Wahhabis were responsible for starting the second war considerably undermined fundamentalism’s appeal. More importantly, however, the reason relates to the basic differences between traditional and fundamentalist conceptions of Islam in Chechnya. Traditional Chechen society was based upon a collection of customs and norms known as ‘Adat, which regulate social relationships. Many of these pre-Islamic customs eventually became the substance of traditional Chechen Islam, as a result of the significant leeway in the practice of local tradition that Sufism allowed. In the form of Sufism, Chechen ‘Adat survived despite various attempts at installing Shari’ah or eliminating religious expression. And, it was in the defense of these customs, masked as the defense of Islam, that traditional Islam became intrinsically linked with Chechen national/ethnic identity.
Meanwhile in Saudi Arabia, a reform movement was underway which sought to eliminate any innovation in Islam not directly mentioned in the Koran or Sunna and which sought the establishment of Islamic regimes based upon strict observance of Shari’ah. Sufism, being a major source of Islamic ‘innovation,’ became one of its primary targets. In addition, the fundamentally Arabic nature of both Shari’ah, as a codification of Arabic traditions, and Wahhabism, as reform movement within (what was to be) Saudi Arabian Islamic society, made the new Islam particularly Arab-centric in its outlook. Over the years a form of radical fundamentalism has proliferated and in relatively recent years become the ideological justification for a number of political revolutionary movements. In post-Soviet Russia traditional forms of Islam and fundamentalism have come into contact with each other, and, as a result of Soviet collapse and the prolonged Chechen war, fundamentalism has extended across a fair segment of Chechen society. Followers of traditional Chechen Islam and fundamentalism, while originally friends in the fight against Russia, were not friends for long.
Attempts to impose Shari’ah on the Chechen population did not go over well among many who stalwartly defended their traditional Islamic practices, seeing fundamentalism as a foreign import not in keeping with Chechen tradition. Notably, however, it was more the fear that Wahhabism was a threat to their nation and their national survival, either in its direct attack on traditional Chechen beliefs or in the belief that it was the Wahhabis who are responsible for the current war with Russia, that has thus far led, to its failure to dominate. As a result of the circumstances of the Russian occupation, many saw the war not only as an attack on radical Islamic terrorists but also an attempt to exterminate the Chechen people altogether. As this fear grew so too did the hatred of the Wahhabi, despite the fact that both factions, among the resistance, were allies against Russia. Their very existence in jeopardy, many Chechens clung to those things that were at the very core of their national identity. Wahhabism, which specifically attacks those core beliefs of Chechen national identity, is therefore seen only as another threat. Wahhabism would undermine the very thing that the majority of Chechens wished to protect and preserve.
With the loss of a coherent social glue as Marxism had been, and the absence of a viable religious establishment, coupled with the destructive force of the war, Wahhabism promised to the social glue that the Islamic establishment and traditional Islam, among many, could not provide. It was to do this through the implementation of Shari’ah, promising divine justice, a divine social order and an individual’s place within that order. This is why so many were attracted to it, clung to it, and fought for it as hard as they did. But in the end, Wahhabism was too foreign, too alien, and would require a complete re-structuring of the very core of Chechen identity. Chechen society, in the battle not just for national liberation, but also for its very existence, was not willing to do this. The contradictions between Wahhabism and Chechen national identity were too important.
So far I have discussed how, despite the overwhelming devastation of the conflict, and despite what may at first glance seem perfect conditions for the spread of radical Islam as a powerful ideological and motivational force throughout Chechnya, it has nevertheless failed to become as influential as both the Russians and the fundamentalists claim it to be. However in a final aside, I want to stress that this does not mean radical Islam has no future role to play in the Russo-Chechen war. It does. Those stimuli that initially led to the growth of Wahhabism haven’t gone away. And, as time goes on, more and more people will have been born and/or come of age in an era where war, indiscriminate discrimination, hatred, and social anarchy run wild. Many Chechens will, in all likelihood, lose any bond or connection with traditional Chechen ways of life. Many, as a result, will be increasingly susceptible to the fundamentalist doctrines. As traditional elements weaken and increasingly fail to serve the individual’s social needs, radical Islam, claiming to explain and provide solutions to one’s misery, will expand and gain influence as a wartime ideology. Russia’s war on terror is, essentially, destroying those more moderate, although increasingly radical, influences that hold back fundamentalism as a central Chechen ideology.
In the end, as it concerns the ideological role of the war on terror, (the new paradigm though which to view and conduct foreign policy,) one must be careful to differentiate between those many splits and nuances within a particular society. One must understand that Islam and terror do not go hand in hand, that there is no such thing as a clash of civilizations, that Islamic fundamentalism doesn’t define the beliefs, practices, and political agendas of a large number of Muslims, and that inter-Islamic factions are often hostile to one another. Failure to understand this could have very negative consequences for all parties involved, as the people, events, nuances, and personal motivations that all contribute to particular society get glossed over and even forgotten. Both Russia’s and the Fundamentalist’s failure to recognize this has led to many indiscriminate killings and the deaths of many innocent terror victims. This only leads to increased misunderstanding, hatred, and radicalism.